A New Mechanism to Alleviate the Crises of Confidence in Science With An Application to the Public Goods GameA Review

Luigi Butera, Philip Grossman, Daniel Houser, John List and Marie Claire Villeval

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: Recently a credibility crisis has taken hold across the social s ciences, arguing that a component of Fischer (1935)'s tripod has not been fully embraced: replication. The importance of replications is not debatable scientifically, but researchers' incentives are not sufficient to encourage replications. We analyze a novel mechanism promoting replications through beneficial gains between scholars and editors. We highlight the tradeoffs involved in seeking independent replications before submission to journals, and demonstrate the operation of this method via an investigation of the effects of Knightian uncertainty on cooperation in public goods games, a pervasive but largely unexplored feature in the literature.

Keywords: Replication; science; public goods; uncertainty; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02512932v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02512932v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02512932

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().