Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution

Massimo Motta () and Michele Polo

No 150, Working Papers from IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University

Abstract: We study the enforcement of competition policy against collusion under Leniency Programs, which give reduced fines to firms revealing information to the Antitrust Authority. Such programs give firms an incentive to break collusion, but may also have a pro-collusive effect, since they decrease the expected cost of misbehaviour. We analyze the optimal policy under alternative rules and with homogeneous and heterogeneous cartels, obtaining a ranking of the different schemes and showing when the use of reduced fines may improve antitrust enforcement.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Leniency programs and cartel prosecution (2003)
Working Paper: Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution (2000)
Working Paper: Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution (1999)
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