Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution

Massimo Motta () and Michele Polo

Economics Working Papers from European University Institute

Abstract: We study the enforcement of competition policy against collusion under Leniency Programs, which gave reduced fines to firms revealing information ot the Antitrust Authority. Such programs give firms an incentive to break collusion, but may also have a pro-collusive effect, since they decrease the expected cost of misbehaviour.

Keywords: COMPETITION; MARKET STRUCTURE; ANTITRUST LEGISLATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 L44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Leniency programs and cartel prosecution (2003)
Working Paper: Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution (2000)
Working Paper: Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco99/23

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