Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution

Michele Polo and Massimo Motta ()

No 2349, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study the enforcement of competition policy against collusion under Leniency Programs, which give reduced fines to firms revealing information to the Antitrust Authority. Such programs give firms an incentive to break collusion, but may also have a pro-collusive effect, since they decrease the expected cost of misbehaviour. We analyze the optimal policy under alternative rules, obtaining a ranking of the different schemes and showing when the use of reduced fines may improve antitrust enforcement.

Keywords: Amnesties; Antitrust; Cartels; Collusion; Optimal deterrence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 K20 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Leniency programs and cartel prosecution (2003)
Working Paper: Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution (1999)
Working Paper: Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution
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