How Do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions and Economic Policies?

Torsten Persson (), Gérard Roland and Guido Tabellini

No 251, Working Papers from IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University

Abstract: We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coalitions and fiscal policies are endogenously determined. The model predicts that, relative to proportional elections, majoritarian elections reduce government spending because they reduce party fragmentation and therefore, the incidence of coalition governments. Party fragmentation can persist under majoritarian rule if party supporters are unevenly distributed across electoral districts. Economic and political data, from up to 50 post-war parliamentary democracies, strongly support our joint predictions from the electoral rule, to the party system, to the type of government, and to government spending.

Date: 2003
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Related works:
Working Paper: How do electoral rules shape party structures, government coalitions, and ecnomic policies? (2012)
Working Paper: How do electoral rules shape party structures, government coalitions, and economic policies? (2004)
Working Paper: How Do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions, and Economic Policies? (2004)
Working Paper: How do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions and Economic Policies? (2004)
Working Paper: How Do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions, and Economic Policies? (2003)
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