How do electoral rules shape party structures, government coalitions, and ecnomic policies?

Gérard Roland, Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini

Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Date: 2012-02-27
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Related works:
Working Paper: How do electoral rules shape party structures, government coalitions, and economic policies? (2004)
Working Paper: How Do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions, and Economic Policies? (2004)
Working Paper: How do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions and Economic Policies? (2004)
Working Paper: How Do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions and Economic Policies? (2003)
Working Paper: How Do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions, and Economic Policies? (2003)
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