How Do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions, and Economic Policies?

Torsten Persson (), Gérard Roland and Guido Tabellini

No 10176, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coalitions and fiscal policies are endogenously determined. The model predicts that, relative to proportional elections, majoritarian elections reduce government spending because they reduce party fragmentation and, therefore, the incidence of coalition governments. Party fragmentation can persist under majoritarian rule if party supporters are unevenly distributed across electoral districts. Economic and political data, from up to 50 post-war parliamentary democracies, strongly support our joint predictions from the electoral rule, to the party system, to the type of government, and to government spending.

JEL-codes: D72 H00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-12
Note: PE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (47)

Published as Persson, Torsten, Gerard Roland, and Guido Tabellini. "Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies." Quarterly Journal of Political Science 2, 2 (2007): 155-88.

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Related works:
Working Paper: How do electoral rules shape party structures, government coalitions, and ecnomic policies? (2012)
Working Paper: How do electoral rules shape party structures, government coalitions, and economic policies? (2004)
Working Paper: How Do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions, and Economic Policies? (2004)
Working Paper: How do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions and Economic Policies? (2004)
Working Paper: How Do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions and Economic Policies? (2003)
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