How do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions and Economic Policies?

Torsten Persson (torsten.persson@iies.su.se), Gérard Roland and Guido Tabellini
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Tan Gui Wen

No 4226, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coalitions and fiscal policies are endogenously determined. The model predicts that, relative to proportional elections, majoritarian elections reduce government spending because they reduce party fragmentation and, therefore, the incidence of coalition governments. Party fragmentation can persist under majoritarian rule if party supporters are unevenly distributed across electoral districts. Economic and political data, from up to 50 post-war parliamentary democracies, strongly support our joint predictions from the electoral rule, to the party system, to the type of government, and to government spending.

Keywords: Fiscal policy; Electoral rules; Party systems; Electoral accountability; Coalition governments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-lam, nep-mac, nep-pbe and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Related works:
Working Paper: How do electoral rules shape party structures, government coalitions, and ecnomic policies? (2012)
Working Paper: How do electoral rules shape party structures, government coalitions, and economic policies? (2004)
Working Paper: How Do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions, and Economic Policies? (2004)
Working Paper: How Do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions and Economic Policies? (2003)
Working Paper: How Do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions, and Economic Policies? (2003)
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