Imperfectly Observable Commitments in n-Player Games

Werner Gueth, Georg Kirchsteiger and Klaus Ritzberger
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Werner Gueth: Institut fuer Wirtschaftstheorie III, Humboldt-Universitaet Berlin
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Werner Güth ()

No 35, Economics Series from Institute for Advanced Studies

Abstract: In a two-stage extensive form game where followers can observe moves by leaders only with noise, pure subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the limiting game without noise may not survive arbitrarily small noise. Still, for generic games, there is always at least one subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game with no noise that is approximated by equilibrium outcomes of games with small noise. This, however, depends crucially on generic payoffs.

Keywords: Commitments; Imperfect Observability; Subgame Perfection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 1996-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/922 First version, 1996 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Imperfectly Observable Commitments inn-Player Games (1998)
Working Paper: Imperfectly observable commitments in n-player games (1998)
Working Paper: Imperfectly Observable Commitments in n-Player Games (1995)
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