Imperfectly Observable Commitments in n-Player Games

Werner Güth (), Georg Kirchsteiger and Klaus Ritzberger

Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics

Date: 1995-12
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Published in Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 23, No. 1, March 1998, 54-74

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Related works:
Journal Article: Imperfectly Observable Commitments inn-Player Games (1998)
Working Paper: Imperfectly observable commitments in n-player games (1998)
Working Paper: Imperfectly Observable Commitments in n-Player Games (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vie:viennp:vie9507

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