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Imperfectly observable commitments in n-player games

Georg Kirchsteiger (), Werner Güth () and Klaus Ritzberger

ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Date: 1998-04
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Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (1998) v.23 n° 1,p.54-74

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Related works:
Journal Article: Imperfectly Observable Commitments inn-Player Games (1998) Downloads
Working Paper: Imperfectly Observable Commitments in n-Player Games (1996) Downloads
Working Paper: Imperfectly Observable Commitments in n-Player Games (1995)
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