Poaching and Firm-Sponsored Training

Jens Mohrenweiser, Thomas Zwick and Uschi Backes-Gellner

No 51, Economics of Education Working Paper Series from University of Zurich, Department of Business Administration (IBW)

Abstract: A series of seminal theoretical papers argues that poaching of employees may hamper company-sponsored general training like apprenticeship training in Germany. Empirically however, the existence and extent of poaching still remains an open question. We provide a novel empirical strategy to identify poaching and investigate its causes and consequences. We find that only a few apprenticeship training firms in Germany are poaching victims or raiders. Poaching victim firms are more likely to be in a temporary downturn and raiding firms are more likely to increase their workforce. Poaching victims hardly change their training strategy after poaching. Thus, poaching is a transitory event and not a general threat to apprenticeship training. This is an important result for countries that intend to introduce apprenticeship type of training and need to convince firms to participate in their endeavour.

Keywords: poaching; company sponsored training; recruiting; apprenticeship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J24 M51 M53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 53 pages
Date: 2010-12, Revised 2017-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm and nep-lab
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
http://repec.business.uzh.ch/RePEc/iso/leadinghouse/0051_lhwpaper.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Poaching and Firm‐Sponsored Training (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iso:educat:0051

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics of Education Working Paper Series from University of Zurich, Department of Business Administration (IBW) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sara Brunner ().