Works councils, collective bargaining and apprenticeship training
Ben Kriechel (),
Samuel Muehlemann (),
Harald Pfeifer () and
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Miriam Schuette: Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training (BIBB) Bonn
No 57, Economics of Education Working Paper Series from University of Zurich, Department of Business Administration (IBW)
We investigate the effects of works councils on apprenticeship training. The German law attributes works councils substantial information and co-determination rights on training-related issues. Thus, works councils may also have an impact on the cost-benefit relation of workplace training. Using detailed firm-level data containing information on the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training in Germany, we apply econometric matching methods to identify works council effects. We find that firms with works councils make a significantly higher net investment in apprenticeship training compared to firms without such an institution. However, we also find that the fraction of workers still employed with the same firm five years after training is significantly higher in the presence of works councils, enabling firms to recoup training investments over a longer time horizon. All works council effects, however, are much more pronounced for firms covered by collective bargaining agreements.
Keywords: Works councils; collective bargaining agreement; apprenticeship training; firm-sponsored training (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J24 J50 M53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm and nep-lab
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Working Paper: Works Councils, Collective Bargaining and Apprenticeship Training (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iso:educat:0057
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