Works Councils, Collective Bargaining and Apprenticeship Training

Ben Kriechel, Samuel Mühlemann (), Harald Pfeifer and Miriam Schuette
Additional contact information
Samuel Mühlemann: University of Munich
Miriam Schuette: BIBB
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Samuel Muehlemann

No 6497, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the effects of works councils on apprenticeship training in Germany. The German law attributes works councils substantial information and co-determination rights to training-related issues. Thus, works councils may also have an impact on the cost-benefit relation of workplace training. Using detailed firm-level data containing information on the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training, we find that firms with works councils make a significantly higher net investment in training compared with firms without such an institution. We also find that the fraction of former trainees still employed with the same firm five years after training is significantly higher in the presence of works councils, thus enabling firms to recoup training investments over a longer time horizon. Furthermore, all works council effects are much more pronounced for firms covered by collective bargaining agreements.

Keywords: works councils; collective bargaining agreement; firm-sponsored training; apprenticeship training (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J24 J50 M53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2012-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-hme, nep-hrm and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published - published in: Industrial Relations, 2014, 66 (5), 1095-1112

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Related works:
Working Paper: Works councils, collective bargaining and apprenticeship training (2011)
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