Bargaining, Coalitions and Competition
Oscar Volij () and
Roberto Serrano ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Nir Dagan ()
Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics
We study a decentralized matching model in a large exchange economy, in which trade takes place through non--cooperative bargaining in coalitions of finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with the Walrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof exploits equivalence results between the core and Walrasian equilibria. Our model relaxes differentiability and convexity of preferences thereby covering the case of indivisible goods.
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Published in Economic Theory 2000, vol. 15, pp. 279-296
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Journal Article: Bargaining, coalitions and competition (2000)
Working Paper: Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition (1999)
Working Paper: Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition (1998)
Working Paper: Bargaining, coalitions and competition (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:5107
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