Bargaining, coalitions and competition

Nir Dagan (), Roberto Serrano and Oscar Volij ()

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: We study a decentralized matching model in a large exchange economy, in which trade takes place through non--cooperative bargaining in coalitions of finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with the Walrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof exploits equivalence results between the core and Walrasian equilibria. Our model relaxes differentiability and convexity of preferences thereby covering the case of indivisible goods.

Keywords: Finite coalitions; strategic bargaining; core; Walrasian equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D41 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Bargaining, coalitions and competition (2000)
Working Paper: Bargaining, Coalitions and Competition (2000)
Working Paper: Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition (1999)
Working Paper: Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:178

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