Bargaining, coalitions and competition

Nir Dagan (), Roberto Serrano and Oscar Volij ()

Economic Theory, 2000, vol. 15, issue 2, 279-296

Abstract: We study a Gale-like matching model in a large exchange economy, in which trade takes place through non-cooperative bargaining in coalitions of finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with the Walrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof makes use of the theory of the core. With respect to previous work, our positive implementation result applies to a substantially larger class of economies: the model relaxes differentiability and convexity of preferences, and also admits an arbitrary number of divisible and indivisible goods. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000

Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Finite coalitions and Edgeworthian theory of exchange; Marginal rates of substitution and Jevonsian theory of exchange; Matching and bargaining; Core; Walrasian equilibrium.; JEL Classification Numbers: D51; D41; C78. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Bargaining, Coalitions and Competition (2000)
Working Paper: Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition (1998)
Working Paper: Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition (1996)
Working Paper: Bargaining, coalitions and competition (1996)
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DOI: 10.1007/s001990050013

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