Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition

Nir Dagan (nir@nirdagan.com), Roberto Serrano and Oscar Volij (oscar@volij.co.il)

Economic theory and game theory from Oscar Volij

Abstract: We study a decentralized matching model in a large exchange economy, in which trade takes place through non-cooperative bargaining in coalitions of finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with the Walrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof makes use of the theory of the core. With respect to previous work, our model relaxes differentiability and convexity of preferences, and also admits indivisible goods.

Keywords: Finite coalitions; strategic bargaining; core; Walrasian equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D41 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 1996-06, Revised 1998-07
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Published in Economic Theory 15:279-296 (2000)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Bargaining, coalitions and competition (2000)
Working Paper: Bargaining, Coalitions and Competition (2000)
Working Paper: Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition (1999)
Working Paper: Bargaining, coalitions and competition (1996)
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