Prosocial Managers, Employee Motivation, and the Creation of Shareholder Value

Agne Kajackaite and Dirk Sliwka

No 11789, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Milton Friedman has famously claimed that the responsibility of a manager who is not the owner of a firm is "to conduct the business in accordance with their [the shareholders'] desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible." In this paper we argue that when contracts are incomplete it is not necessarily in the interest even of money maximizing shareholders to pick a manager who pursues this goal. We show in a formal model and in a series of lab experiments that choosing a manager who has a preference to spend resources for social causes can increase employee motivation. In turn, ex-post losses in shareholder value may be offset by ex-ante gains in performance through higher employee motivation.

Keywords: incentives; corporate social responsibility; shareholder value; motivation; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 D21 J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2018-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe and nep-hrm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published - published in: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2020, 172, 217-235

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp11789.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Prosocial managers, employee motivation, and the creation of shareholder value (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11789

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
library@iza.org

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte (hinte@iza.org).