Why Join a Team?

David Cooper (), Krista Saral and Marie Claire Villeval

No 12587, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We present experiments exploring why high ability workers join teams with less able co-workers when there are no short-term financial benefits. We distinguish between two explanations: pro-social preferences and expected long-term financial gains from teaching future teammates. Participants perform a real-effort task and decide whether to work independently or join a two-person team. Treatments vary the payment scheme (piece rate or revenue sharing), whether teammates can communicate, and the role of teaching. High ability workers are more willing to join teams in the absence of revenue sharing and less willing to join teams when they cannot communicate. When communication is possible, the choice of high ability workers to join teams is driven by expected future financial gains from teaching rather than some variety of pro-social preferences. This result has important implications for the role of adverse selection in determining the productivity of teams.

Keywords: self-selection; social preferences; revenue sharing; teaching; teams; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D23 J24 M52 M53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 71 pages
Date: 2019-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm and nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published - revised version published in: Management Science , 2021, 67 (11), 6980-6997

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Related works:
Journal Article: Why Join a Team? (2021)
Working Paper: Why Join a Team? (2021)
Working Paper: Why Join a Team? (2019)
Working Paper: Why Join a Team? (2019)
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