Equality, Equity and Incentives: An Experiment

Loukas Balafoutas, Martin Kocher, Louis Putterman and Matthias Sutter

No 5204, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We devise a new experimental game by nesting a voluntary contributions mechanism in a broader spectrum of incentive schemes. With it, we study tensions between egalitarianism, equity concerns, self-interest, and the need for incentives. In a 2x2 design, subjects either vote on or exogenously encounter incentive settings while assigned unequal incomes that are either task-determined or random. We find subjects’ voting to be mainly self-interested but also influenced by egalitarian and equity concerns, which sometimes cut in opposite directions. Contributions, which seem mainly determined by boundedly rational responses to incentives, are influenced by egalitarian, equity and strategic considerations.

Keywords: experiment; incentives; voluntary contribution mechanism; efficiency; equality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D31 D63 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 61 pages
Date: 2010-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published - revised version published in: European Economic Review, 2013, 60, 32-51

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp5204.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Equality, equity and incentives: An experiment (2013)
Working Paper: Equality, Equity and Incentives: An Experiment (2013)
Working Paper: Equality, Equity and Incentives: An Experiment (2010)
Working Paper: Equality, Equity and Incentives: An Experiment (2010)
Working Paper: Equality, equity, and incentives: An experiment (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5204

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().