Performance Measurement and Incentive Intensity

Alberto Bayo-Moriones, Jose Galdon-Sanchez () and Sara Martinez-de-Morentin

No 9243, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This study addresses the factors that determine the intensity of pay for performance schemes. The results indicate that the use of individual and group incentives boost intensity, whereas plant or firm pay for performance do not seem to affect the variable of interest. In addition, the adoption of measures of results, such as productivity or quality, has a significant positive effect on intensity. On the contrary, measures of human resource management outcomes, subjective measures and financial measures are not significant or have a negative effect on the intensity of pay for performance.

Keywords: pay; for; performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J30 M12 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2015-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-eff and nep-hrm
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Published - published in: Journal of Labor Research, 2017, 38, 496–546

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Journal Article: Performance Measurement and Incentive Intensity (2017)
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