Equity versus Efficiency? - Evidence from Three-Person Generosity Experiments -

Werner Güth (), Kerstin Pull, Manfred Stadler and Agnes Stribeck ()
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Agnes Stribeck: University of Tübingen
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Agnes Bäker

No 2010-018, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: In two-person generosity games the proposer's agreement payoff is exogenously given whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer's choice of the pie size. Earlier results for two-person generosity games show that participants seem to care more for efficiency than for equity. In three-person generosity games equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously excluded or imposed. We predict that the latter crowds out - or at least weakens - efficiency seeking. Our treatments rely on a 2x3 factorial design differing in whether the responder or the third (dummy) player is the residual claimant and whether the proposer's agreement payoff is larger, equal, or smaller than the other exogenously given agreement payoff.

Keywords: generosity game; equity; efficiency; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C91 D03 D3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-03-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Journal Article: Equity versus Efficiency? Evidence from Three-Person Generosity Experiments (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2010-0018

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