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Compulsory Disclosure of Private Information Theoretical and Experimental Results for the "Acquiring-a-Company" Game

Werner Güth (), Kerstin Pull, Manfred Stadler and Alexandra Zaby ()

No 2014-003, Jena Economic Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: Based on the "acquiring-a-company" game of Samuelson and Bazerman (1985), we theoretically and experimentally analyze the acquisition of a firm. Thereby we compare cases of symmetrically and asymmetrically informed buyers and sell- ers. This setting allows us to predict and test the effects of information disclosure as prescribed by two recently implemented directives of the European Union, the Transparency and the Takeover-Bid Directive. Our theoretical and experimental results suggest a welfare-enhancing effect of compulsory information disclosure. Hence, the EU Transparency and the EU Takeover-Bid Directive should both be welfare enhancing.

Keywords: Acquisition of firms; disclosure of private information; experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D61 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-cta, nep-eur, nep-exp and nep-ore
Date: 2014-02-04
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Related works:
Journal Article: Compulsory Disclosure of Private Information: Theoretical and Experimental Results for the Acquiring-a-Company Game (2019) Downloads
Working Paper: Compulsory disclosure of private information theoretical and experimental results for the "acquiring-a-company" game (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Compulsory Disclosure of Private Information - Theoretical and Experimental Results for the Acquiring-a-Company Game (2014) Downloads
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