Compulsory Disclosure of Private Information - Theoretical and Experimental Results for the Acquiring-a-Company Game
Alexandra Zaby (),
Werner Güth (),
Kerstin Pull and
Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association
Based on the acquiring-a-company game of Samuelson and Bazerman (1985), we theoretically and experimentally analyze the acquisition of a firm. Thereby we compare cases of symmetrically and asymmetrically informed buyers and sellers. This setting allows us to predict and test the effects of information disclosure as prescribed by two recently implemented directives of the European Union, the Transparency and the Takeover-Bid Directive. Our theoretical and experimental results suggest a welfare-enhancing effect of compulsory information disclosure. Hence, the EU Transparency and the EU Takeover-Bid Directive should both be welfare enhancing.
JEL-codes: C91 D82 D61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-exp
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Journal Article: Compulsory Disclosure of Private Information: Theoretical and Experimental Results for the Acquiring-a-Company Game (2019)
Working Paper: Compulsory Disclosure of Private Information Theoretical and Experimental Results for the "Acquiring-a-Company" Game (2014)
Working Paper: Compulsory disclosure of private information theoretical and experimental results for the "acquiring-a-company" game (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc14:100520
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