Engineering Trust - Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information

Gary Bolton (), Ben Greiner and Axel Ockenfels

No 42, Working Paper Series in Economics from University of Cologne, Department of Economics

Abstract: Reciprocity in feedback giving distorts the production and content of reputation information in a market, hampering trust and trade efficiency. Guided by feedback patterns observed on eBay and other platforms we run laboratory experiments to investigate how reciprocity can be managed by changes in the way feedback information flows through the system, leading to more accurate reputation information, more trust and more efficient trade. We discuss the implications for theory building and for managing the redesign of market trust systems.

Keywords: market design; reputation; trust; reciprocity; eBay (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C9 D02 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-02-24, Revised 2011-01-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Engineering Trust: Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information (2013)
Working Paper: Engineering Trust - Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information (2009)
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