Engineering Trust: Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information

Gary Bolton (), Ben Greiner and Axel Ockenfels

Management Science, 2013, vol. 59, issue 2, 265-285

Abstract: Reciprocity in feedback giving distorts the production and content of reputation information in a market, hampering trust and trade efficiency. Guided by feedback patterns observed on eBay and other platforms, we run laboratory experiments to investigate how reciprocity can be managed by changes in the way feedback information flows through the system, leading to more accurate reputation information, more trust, and more efficient trade. We discuss the implications for theory building and for managing the redesign of market trust systems. This paper was accepted by Teck Ho, decision analysis.

Keywords: market design; reputation; trust; reciprocity; eBay (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (139)

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1120.1609 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Engineering Trust - Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information (2011)
Working Paper: Engineering Trust - Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:59:y:2013:i:2:p:265-285

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