Cheating and loss aversion: do people lie more to avoid a loss?

Gilles Grolleau (), Martin Kocher and Angela Sutan

Discussion Papers in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: Does the extent of cheating depend on a proper reference point? We use a real effort task that implements a two (gain versus loss frame) times two (monitored performance versus unmonitored performance) between-subjects design to examine whether cheating is reference-dependent. Our experimental findings show that self-reported performance in the unmonitored condition is significantly higher than actual performance in the monitored condition - a clear indication for cheating. However, the level of cheating is by far higher in the loss frame than in the gain frame. Furthermore, men are much more strongly affected by the framing than women.

Keywords: Cheating; Lying; Loss aversion; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-08-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Cheating and loss aversion: do people lie more to avoid a loss? (2016)
Working Paper: Cheating and Loss Aversion: Do People Lie More to Avoid a Loss? (2014)
Working Paper: Cheating and loss aversion: do people lie more to avoid a loss? (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenec:21387

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