La rupture conventionnelle: objectifs officiels versus enjeux implicites

Nathalie Berta (), Camille Signoretto and Julie Valentin ()
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Nathalie Berta: OMI - Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne et Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
Julie Valentin: Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, https://centredeconomiesorbonne.cnrs.fr

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: The ‘conventional cancelation’ is a way for employer and employee to mutually agree for ending the labor contract. Officially, it will permit to raise mutually beneficial agreements and to reduce the judge role. First, what is at stake here is the bargaining capacity of the employee and the nature of his agreement since he is in a relation of subordination. Second, the meaning of the eviction of the judge will be also questioned

Keywords: Conventional cancelation; layoff; labor economy; labor contract; law and economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J83 J88 K31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2010-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2010/10101.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: La rupture conventionnelle: objectifs officiels versus enjeux implicites (2012)
Working Paper: La rupture conventionnelle: objectifs officiels vers enjeux implicites (2012)
Working Paper: La rupture conventionnelle: objectifs officiels vers enjeux implicites (2012)
Working Paper: La rupture conventionnelle: objectifs officiels versus enjeux implicites (2010)
Working Paper: La rupture conventionnelle: objectifs officiels versus enjeux implicites (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:10101

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