$100 Bills on the Sidewalk: Suboptimal Investment in 401(k) Plans

James Choi, David Laibson and Brigitte Madrian

No 11554, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: It is typically difficult to determine whether households invest optimally. But sometimes, investment incentives are strong enough to create sharp normative restrictions. We identify employees at seven companies who are eligible to receive employer matching contributions in their 401(k) and can make penalty-free withdrawals for any reason. For these employees, contributing less than the match threshold is a dominated action that violates the no-arbitrage condition. Nevertheless, between 20% and 60% contribute below the threshold, losing as much as 6% of their annual pay. Providing employees with information about the free lunch they are foregoing fails to raise contribution rates.

JEL-codes: G1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fmk
Note: AG EFG PE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Published as James J. Choi & David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian, 2011. "$100 Bills on the Sidewalk: Suboptimal Investment in 401(k) Plans," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 93(3), pages 748-763, 03.

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Journal Article: $100 Bills on the Sidewalk: Suboptimal Investment in 401(k) Plans (2011)
Working Paper: $100 Bills on the Sidewalk: Suboptimal Investment in 401(K) Plans (2009)
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