Checkmate: Exploring Backward Induction Among Chess Players

Steven Levitt, John List and Sally E. Sadoff

No 15610, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Although backward induction is a cornerstone of game theory, most laboratory experiments have found that agents are not able to successfully backward induct. Much of this evidence, however, is generated using the Centipede game, which is ill-suited for testing the theory. In this study, we analyze the play of world class chess players both in the centipede game and in another class of games - Race to 100 games - that are pure tests of backward induction. We find that world class chess players behave like student subjects in the centipede game, virtually never playing the backward induction equilibrium In the race to 100 games, in contrast, we find that many chess players properly backward induct. Consistent with our claim that the Centipede game is not a useful test of backward induction, we find no systematic within-subject relationship between choices in the centipede game and performance in pure backward induction games.

JEL-codes: C9 C91 C92 C93 D01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-12
Note: IO LS
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Published as Steven D. Levitt & John A. List & Sally E. Sadoff, 2011. "Checkmate: Exploring Backward Induction among Chess Players," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 975-90, April.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Checkmate: Exploring Backward Induction among Chess Players (2011)
Working Paper: Checkmate: Exploring backward induction among chess players (2010)
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