Toward an understanding of the relative strengths of positive and negative reciprocity
Omar Al-Ubaydli,
Uri Gneezy,
Min Sok Lee and
John List
No 16547, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
A stylized fact is that agents respond more acutely to negative than positive stimuli. Such findings have generated insights on mechanism-design, have been featured prominently in policymaking, and more generally have led to discussions of whether preferences are defined over consumption levels or changes in consumption. This study reconsiders this stylized fact. In doing so, it provides insights into an important domain wherein positive stimuli induce a greater response than negative stimuli: a principal-agent game with reputational considerations and with the agent on the market's short end. This common setting represents an important feature of labor markets with involuntary unemployment.
JEL-codes: C9 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-11
Note: LS
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
Published as Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 5, No. 7, December 2010, pp. 524–539
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Journal Article: Towards an understanding of the relative strengths of positive and negative reciprocity (2010)
Working Paper: Toward an understanding of the relative strengths of positive and negative reciprocity (2010)
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