Are Women More Attracted to Cooperation Than Men?

Peter Kuhn and Marie Claire Villeval

No 19277, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We conduct a real-effort experiment where participants choose between individual compensation and team-based pay. In contrast to tournaments, which are often avoided by women, we find that women choose team-based pay at least as frequently as men in all our treatments and conditions, and significantly more often than men in a well-defined subset of those cases. Key factors explaining gender patterns in attraction to co-operative incentives across experimental conditions include women's more optimistic assessments of their prospective teammate's ability and men's greater responsiveness to efficiency gains associated with team production. Women also respond differently to alternative rules for team formation in a manner that is consistent with stronger inequity aversion

JEL-codes: C91 J16 J24 J31 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-dem, nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-lab
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

Published as Peter Kuhn & Marie Claire Villeval, 2015. "Are Women More Attracted to Co‐operation Than Men?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(582), pages 115-140, 02.

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Working Paper: Are women more attracted to cooperation than men? (2015)
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