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What Happens When Employers Can No Longer Discriminate in Job Ads?

Peter Kuhn and Kailing Shen

No 29116, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: When employers’ explicit gender requests were unexpectedly removed from a Chinese job board overnight, pools of successful applicants became more integrated: women’s (men’s) share of call-backs to jobs that had requested men (women) rose by 63 (146) percent. The removal ‘worked’ in this sense because it generated a large increase in gender-mismatched applications, and because those applications were treated surprisingly well by employers. The removal had little or no effect on aggregate matching frictions. The job titles that were integrated however, were not the most gendered ones, and were disproportionately lower-wage jobs.

JEL-codes: J16 J63 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna, nep-gen, nep-hrm, nep-isf and nep-lab
Note: LS
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published as Peter Kuhn & Kailing Shen, 2023. "What Happens When Employers Can No Longer Discriminate in Job Ads?," American Economic Review, vol 113(4), pages 1013-1048.

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