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Relational Communication

Anton Kolotilin () and Hongyi Li ()
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Hongyi Li: School of Economics, UNSW Business School

No 2018-12a, Discussion Papers from School of Economics, The University of New South Wales

Abstract: We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver's decision-making and signal the sender's information. Although full separation can always be supported in equilibrium, partial or complete pooling is optimal if the receiver's decision-making is highly responsive to information. In this case, the receiver's decision-making is disciplined by pooling extreme states, where she is most tempted to defect. In characterizing optimal equilibria, we establish new results on monotone persuasion.

Keywords: strategic communication; monotone persuasion; relational contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 61 pages
Date: 2019-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-mic
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http://research.economics.unsw.edu.au/RePEc/papers/2018-12a.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Relational Communication (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: Relational Communication (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: Relational Communication (2018) Downloads
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