Anton Kolotilin () and
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We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver's decision-making and signal the sender's information. Although full separation can always be supported in equilibrium, partial or complete pooling is optimal if the receiver's decision-making is highly responsive to information. In this case, the receiver's decision-making is disciplined by pooling extreme states where she is most tempted to defect.
Date: 2019-01, Revised 2020-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Working Paper: Relational Communication (2020)
Working Paper: Relational Communication (2019)
Working Paper: Relational Communication (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1901.05645
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