Anton Kolotilin () and
Hongyi Li ()
Additional contact information
Hongyi Li: School of Economics, UNSW Business School
No 2018-12b, Discussion Papers from School of Economics, The University of New South Wales
We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver’s decision-making and signal the sender’s information. Although full separation can always be supported in equilibrium, partial or complete pooling is optimal if the receiver’s decision-making is highly responsive to information. In this case, the receiver’s decision-making is disciplined by pooling extreme states, where she is most tempted to defect.
Keywords: strategic communication; relational contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Relational Communication (2020)
Working Paper: Relational Communication (2019)
Working Paper: Relational Communication (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:swe:wpaper:2018-12b
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Discussion Papers from School of Economics, The University of New South Wales Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Hongyi Li ().