Incentives and Workers' Motivation in the Public Sector

Josse Delfgaauw and Robert Dur

No 04-060/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: Civil servants have a reputation for being lazy. However, people's personal experiences with civil servants frequently run counter to this stereotype. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts for public sector workers under different informational assumptions. When civil servants' effort is unverifiable, lazy workers find working in the public sector highly attractive and may crowd out dedicated workers. When effort is verifiable, a cost-minimising government optimally attracts dedicated workers as well as the economy's laziest workers by offering separating contracts, which are both distorted.

This discussion paper has resulted in a publication in The Economic Journal .

Keywords: Public Sector Labour Markets; Incentive Contracts; Work Ethics; Public Service Motivation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H1 J3 J4 L3 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-06-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Incentives and Workers' Motivation in the Public Sector (2008)
Journal Article: Incentives and Workers’ Motivation in the Public Sector (2008)
Working Paper: Incentives and Workers’ Motivation in the Public Sector (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20040060

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