Self-Confidence and Strategic Deterrence

Gary Charness, Aldo Rustichini and Jeroen van de Ven ()
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Aldo Rustichini: University of Minnesota

No 11-151/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: We examine factors that may contribute to 'overconfidence' in relative ability on an intelligence test. We test experimentally for evidence of self-esteem concerns and instrumental strategic concerns. Errors in Bayesian updating are rare when the information does not involve own relative ability, but far more common when it does, suggesting self-esteem issues. There is also strong evidence that males state higher levels of confidence in relative ability when this precedes a tournament; as entry is predicted by relative confidence, this can be an effective deterrent. Inflating confidence can be part of an equilibrium strategy, providing a rationale for strategic overconfidence.

Keywords: Self-confidence; overconfidence; strategic deterrence; unconscious behavior; selfdeception (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A12 C91 D03 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-10-27
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20110151

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