Shooting the Messenger? Supply and Demand in Markets for Willful Ignorance

Shaul Shalvi, Ivan Soraperra, Joël van der Weele and Marie Claire Villeval
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Shaul Shalvi: University of Amsterdam
Joël van der Weele: University of Amsterdam

No 19-071/I, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: We investigate the role of advisers in the transmission of ethically relevant information, a critical aspect of executive decision making in organizations. In our laboratory experiment, advisers are informed about the negative externalities associated with the decision-maker's choices and compete with other advisers. We find that advisers suppress about a quarter of "inconvenient'' information. Suppression is not strategic, but based on the advisers' own preferences in the ethical dilemma. On the demand side, a substantial minority of decision makers avoid advisers who transmit inconvenient information (they "shoot the messenger''). Overall, by facilitating assortative matching, a competitive market for advisers efficiently caters to the demand for both information and information avoidance. Decision-makers are less likely to implement their preferred option when they are randomly matched to advisers and there is no scope for assortative matching.

Keywords: Self-deception; information avoidance; unethical behavior; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D82 D83 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-10-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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