From Ultimatum to Nash Bargaining: Theory and Experimental Evidence

S. Fischer, Werner Güth (), A. Stiehler and Wieland Müller

No 2003-41, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Keywords: commitment; imperfect observability; ultimatum bargaining games; Nash bargaining game; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Journal Article: From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence (2006)
Working Paper: From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence (2006)
Working Paper: From Ultimatum to Nash Bargaining: Theory and Experimental Evidence (2003)
Working Paper: From Ultimatum to Nash Bargaining: Theory and Experimental Evidence
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