Screening, Competition, and Job Design Economic Origins of Good Jobs

Björn Bartling, Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt ()

Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems from Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich

Keywords: job design; high-performance work systems; screening; reputation; competition; trust; control; social preferences; complementarities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cse, nep-cta and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13257/1/297.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs (2012)
Working Paper: Screening, competition, and job design: Economic origins of good jobs (2012)
Working Paper: Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs (2010)
Working Paper: Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs (2010)
Working Paper: Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs (2010)
Working Paper: Screening, competition, and job design: economic origins of good jobs (2010)
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