A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities

Federico Echenique

No E01-299, Economics Working Papers from University of California at Berkeley

Abstract: I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualifications, games with a unique equilibrium have complementarities if and only if Cournot best-response dynamics has no cycles; and that all games with multiple equilibria have complementarities. This is a negative result because it implies that the predictive power of complementarities alone is very weak. As an application of my results I show that generic 2 X 2 games either have no pure-strategy equilibria, or are GSC.

Date: 2001-04-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/groups/iber/wps/econ/E01-299.pdf main text (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/groups/iber/wps/econ/E01-299.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> http://haas.berkeley.edu/groups/iber/wps/econ/E01-299.pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A characterization of strategic complementarities (2004)
Working Paper: A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities (2002)
Working Paper: A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucb:calbwp:e01-299

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IBER, F502 Haas Building, University of California, Berkeley CA 94720-1922

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Working Papers from University of California at Berkeley University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().