A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities

Federico Echenique

Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Abstract: I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualifications, games with a unique equilibrium have complementarities if and only if Cournot best-response dynamics has no cycles; and that all games with multiple equilibria have complementarities. This is a negative result because it implies that the predictive power of complementarities alone is very weak. As an application of my results I show that generic 2 X 2 games either have no pure-strategy equilibria, or are GSC.

Keywords: Strategic complementarities; supermodular games; non-standard analysis; Cournot best-response dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-04-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A characterization of strategic complementarities (2004)
Working Paper: A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:econwp:qt5w13s4z2

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