A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities

Federico Echenique

GE, Growth, Math methods from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualifications, games with a unique equilibrium have complementarities if and only if Cournot best-response dynamics has no cycles; and that all games with multiple equilibria have complementarities. This is a negative result because it implies that the predictive power of complementarities alone is very weak. As an application of my results I show that generic 2 X 2 games either have no pure-strategy equilibria, or are GSC.

JEL-codes: C62 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2001-04-23
Note: 19 pages, Acrobat .pdf
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/ge/papers/0103/0103001.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A characterization of strategic complementarities (2004)
Working Paper: A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities (2002)
Working Paper: A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities (2001)
Working Paper: A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities (2001)
Working Paper: A characterization of strategic complementarities (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpge:0103001

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in GE, Growth, Math methods from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).