A characterization of strategic complementarities

Federico Echenique

No 501, Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) from Department of Economics - dECON

Abstract: I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualifications, games with a unique equilibrium have complementarities if and only if Cournot best-response dynamics has no cycles; and that all games with multiple equi- libria have complementarities. As applications of my results, I show: 1. That generic 2X2 games either have no pure-strategy equilibria, or have complementarities. 2. That generic two-player finite ordinal potential games have complementarities.

Keywords: Strategic complementarities; supermodular games; non-standard analysis; Cournot best-response dynamics; potential games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2001-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/1935 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A characterization of strategic complementarities (2004)
Working Paper: A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities (2002)
Working Paper: A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities (2001)
Working Paper: A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities (2001)
Working Paper: A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ude:wpaper:0501

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