Worker Training and Competing on Product Quality

Christos Bilanakos (), John Heywood, John Sessions () and Nikolaos Theodoropoulos

University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics from University of Cyprus Department of Economics

Abstract: We examine the relationship between firm-sponsored training and the sensitivity of product demand to product quality. A quality-adjusted model of monopolistic competition shows the conditions under which the intensity of training increases as product demand becomes more sensitive to quality. Empirical estimates from two cross sections and a panel of British establishments as well as from two matched employee cross sections confirm that training is more intensive when product demand is more sensitive to quality.

Keywords: Training; Product Quality; Demand Elasticity; Monopolistic Competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2014-10
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucy:cypeua:08-2014

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