The Pizza Night Game: Efficiency, Conflict and Inequality in Tacit Bargaining Games with Focal Points
Andrea Isoni (),
Robert Sugden and
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Jiwei Zheng: University of East Anglia
No 18-01, Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.
We report the results of a new tacit bargaining experiment that provides two key insights on the effects of payoff inequality on coordination and cooperation towards mutually beneficial outcomes. The experiment features the novel Pizza Night game, which can disentangle the effects of payoff inequality from those of conflict of interest. When coordination relies on focal points based on labelling properties, payoff inequality does not interfere with the successful use of those properties. When coordination results in mutual benefit, payoff inequality is not an obstacle to the realisation of efficiency. Conflict of interest is the main barrier to successful coordination.
Keywords: Pizza Night game; tacit bargaining; conflict of interest; payoff inequality; focal points (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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