Sharp Teeth or Empty Mouths? European Institutional Diversity and the Sector-Level Minimum Wage Bite

Andrea Garnero, Stephan Kampelmann and Francois Rycx

ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: The article explores the link between different institutional features of minimum wage systems and the minimum wage bite. We notably address the striking absence of studies on sectoral-level minima and exploit unique data covering 17 European countries and information from more than 1,100 collective bargaining agreements. Results provide evidence for a neglected trade-off: systems with bargained sectoral-level minima are associated with higher Kaitz indices than systems with statutory floors, but also with more individuals actually paid below prevailing minima. Higher collective bargaining coverage can, to some extent, reduce this trade-off between sharp teeth (high wage floors) and empty mouths (non-compliance/non-coverage).

Date: 2015-12
Note: SCOPUS: ar.j
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Published in: British journal of industrial relations (2015) v.53 n° 4,p.760-788

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Related works:
Journal Article: Sharp Teeth or Empty Mouths? European Institutional Diversity and the Sector-Level Minimum Wage Bite (2015)
Working Paper: Sharp Teeth or Empty Mouths? European Institutional Diversity and the Sector-Level Minimum Wage Bite (2015)
Working Paper: Sharp Teeth or Empty Mouths? European Institutional Diversity and the Sector-Level Minimum Wage Bite (2015)
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