CARESS Working Papres

From University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences
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Costly Coasian Contracts': Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli
Experimentation and Competition': Arthur Fishman and Rafael Rob
An Equilibrium Model of Firm Growth and Industry Dynamics': Arthur Fishman and Rafael Rob
The Social Basis of Interdependent Preferences': Andrew Postlewaite
Cooperation and Computability in N-Player Games': Luca Anderlini and Hamid Sabourian
The Impact of Capital-Based Regulation on Bank Risk-Taking: A Dynamic Model': Paul Calem and Rafael Rob
Technological Innovations: Slumps and Booms': Leonardo Felli and Francois Ortalo-Magne
Evaluating Density Forecasts: Francis Diebold, Todd A. Gunther and Anthony S Tay
Measuring Predictability: Theory and Macroeconomic Applications: Francis Diebold and Lutz Kilian
Policy Persistence: Stephen Coate and Stephen Morris
Optimal Prediction Under Asymmetric Loss: Peter Christoffersen and Francis Diebold
Child Nutrition, Child Health, and School Enrollment: A Longitudinal Analysis: Harold Alderman, Jere Behrman, Victor Lavy and Rekha Menon
How Strongly is Child Schooling Associated with Household Income?: Jere Behrman and James C. Knowles
Child Health and Schooling Achievement: Association, Causality and Household Allocations: Jere Behrman and Victor Lavy
Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms: Harold Cole, George Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite
Indeterminacy, Home Production, and the Business Cycle: a Calibrated Analysis: Roberto Perli
Eliminating Race Differences in School Attainment and Labor Market Success: Michael Keane and Kenneth Wolpin
Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions: George Mailath, Larry Samuelson and Avner Shaked
A Model of Commodity Money, With Application to Gresham's Law and the Debasement Puzzle: Francois Velde, Warren Weber and Randall Wright
Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory: Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Search, Bargaining, and Money: Melvyn Cole and Randall Wright
Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons From Evolutionary Game Theory': George Mailath
Japan's Enigmatic Coexistence of Strong Currency and Trade Surplus': Yochanan Shachmurove
The Effects of Immigration on Socioeconomic Gaps in Labor Managed System Versus in a Competitive System': Yochanan Shachmurove and Tikva Leker
Learning Correlated Equilibria in Potential Games': Antonella Ianni
Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search': George Mailath, Larry Samuelson and Avner Shaked
Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective': George Mailath and Stephen Morris
The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives': Alessandro Lizzeri and Nicola Persico
Consensus and Co-Existence in an Interactive Process of Opinion Formation': Valentina Corradi and Antonella Ianni
Ergodicity and Clustering in Opinion Formation': Valentina Corradi and Antonella Ianni
Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be': George Mailath and Larry Samuelson
Who Wants a Good Reputation?': George Mailath and Larry Samuelson
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments': Harold Cole, George Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite
Earnings and Wealth Inequality and Income Taxation: Quantifying the Trade-Offs of Switching to a Proportional Income Tax in the U.S.': Ana Castañeda, Javier Díaz-Giménez and José-Víctor Ríos-Rull
Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project': Leslie Marx and Steven Matthews
Reputation and Competition': Johannes Hörner
A Bayesian Approach to Uncentainty Aversion: Yoram Halevy and Vincent Feltkamp
Renegotiating Moral Hazard Contracts Under Limited Liability and Monotonicity: Steven Matthews
More on Marriage, Fertility, and the Distribution of Inocome: Jeremy Greenwood, Nezih Guner and John Knowles
Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence': John Knowles, Nicola Persico and Petra Todd
Adjustment Costs, Learning-by-Doing, and Technology Adoption under Uncertainty': Anna Pavlova
Consensus and the Accuracy of Signals: Optimal Committee Design with Endogenous Information': Nicola Persico
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring': George Mailath and Stephen Morris
Two Problems Concerning the Role of Neoclassical Firms in Perfect Financial Markets or, The Emperor Has (Well, Almost) No Clothes: David Cass and Catherine Rouzaud
Quantity Discounts for Taste-Varying Consumers: Eugenio Miravete
A Theory of Negotiation and Formation of Coalition: Armando Gomes
The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case: Ichiro Obara
Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility: Richard McLean and Andrew Postlewaite
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring: George Mailath and Stephen Morris
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in a Finite Economy: Harold Cole, George Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies: Harold Cole, George Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite
Endogenous Interactions: George Mailath, Larry Samuelson and Avner Shaked
Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective: George Mailath and Stephen Morris
Investment and Concern for Relative Position: Harold Cole, George Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite
Market Selection and Asymmetric Information: George Mailath and Alvaro Sandroni
Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be: George Mailath and Larry Samuelson
Who Wants a Good Reputation?: George Mailath and Larry Samuelson

CARESS Working Papres

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